This is what was observed during the last decades

Among the good news of the re-entry, world trade figures came back in positive territory: in July, according to the CPB (Netherlands forecast Office), the volume of world trade has increased by 3.5 from June, the figure for June is an increase of 1.6 over may. These figures are, of course, tempered by German exports decline recorded in August and the low optimism of the Baltic Dry Index - indicator Advanced Exchange. But they contrast with the deep dive of world trade during the crisis:-6,7 in the last quarter of 2008,-11 in the first quarter of 2009 and still-0,7 in the second quarter of 2009.

The over-reaction of the trade to GDP during the crisis escaped person. In the Japan, for example, the volume of exports decreased by 15 in the last quarter of 2008 and 26 in the first quarter of 2009, while the GDP decreased respectively "and" 3.6 3.8 in the two quarters. Why trade production multiplied reaction

Often explanation is the international value chain fragmentation: today, a final product (say, a computer) contains many components imported crossing borders several times before being assembled in the final product. Each of these components is saved for its total in the reviews of import value, while the computer is saved in the GDP for value added in the country where it is assembled. Thus, the increasing fragmentation of value chain leads mechanically more rapid trade than of GDP growth, since the same computer contains more imported components. This is what was observed during the last decades. However, this does not mean that a fall of 1 global GDP must lead to a fall in world trade of more than 1: faced with a decline of 1 of the application of computers, the manufacturer will reduce 1 (and not more than 1) its orders for intermediate products. One could observe an over-reaction of trade only if the string value was changed by the crisis (for example, if computer manufacturers MTPF on domestic suppliers), or if the fall in world demand was primarily based on the fragmented sectors internationally. Simulations conducted at the Cepii from a multinational and multisectoral model show that this is not, very far away, to explain the observed overshooting of world trade at the end of 2008 and early 2009.

Then, in the fault Some accusent the protectionist measures taken by a number of countries since the beginning of the crisis. Yet, this concern is unwarranted so far, for two reasons. First, the fall of the trade was very brutal - trade plunged from November 2008-, whereas protectionist measures have been taken gradually. Then, even if the "Global Trade Alert" identifies 437 protectionist measures or application already, measures are, for the moment, usually very targeted on a product and a couple of countries, so that they are not such as to strongly affect world trade.

More likely, the spectacular collapse of world trade during the crisis is due to the removal to the attrition of the credit and the dizzying decline in investment. These three phenomena are not called to last and can therefore be relatively optimistic about a rebound in world trade, except to observe a significant rise of protectionism (as was the case during the great depression of 1929) in connection with the continuation of the increase in unemployment. It remains that, if a "démondialisation" does not appear to currently in view, a conclusion of Doha round is not high among the priorities of the rich countries, especially in the United States. Or simulations made to Cepii show that a judgment of the globalization process could reduce by about 2 percentage points the pace of growth in world trade over the past decades. The end of the crisis, therefore, but perhaps also the end of an era of exceptional expansion of world trade, if there was not a commitment policy hard for free trade.